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Abstract
The British foreign exchange reserves decreased by 40 percent during the period August
1996-December 1999 although the Pound Sterling is considered a floating exchange rate since
it left the EMS in 1992. Since changes in the level of foreign exchange reserves are usually
taken as indicators for foreign exchange interventions in the economic literature we
investigate the case of the British reserves in detail. While the Pound Sterling has appreciated
strongly against the Deutsch mark in this period its exchange rate versus the US dollar has
remained comparatively stable. However, the Bank of England has denied any interventions
in the foreign exchange markets. We find that transactions for the government, such as
repayments of Treasury bonds, account for a large part of the decrease in reserves. Valuation
changes due to exchange rate fluctuations can explain only a small fraction of the decrease.
This result shows that variability in official reserves is not necessarily associated with foreign
exchange intervention. However, even after estimating the effects of exchange rate
fluctuations and interest earnings and correcting for government transactions we still find a
considerable decrease in the UK reserves that is not explained by either the Bank of England
or HM Treasury.
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Non-technical summary
According to pure textbook economics floating exchange rate regimes are characterised by
relatively high volatility in the exchange rate and relatively low volatility in the level of
foreign exchange reserves. This classification is widely used in several recent research papers
in which exchange rate policies of different countries are analysed. With this background the
case of the British Pound Sterling presents an interesting one to study. Although Sterling is
considered a floating exchange rate since it left the EMS in 1992 the level of UK foreign
exchange reserves decreased by 40 percent during the period August/September 1996 –
December 1999 while at the same time the Pound Sterling/US Dollar exchange rate has been
very stable. This is what we call the “British foreign exchange reserve puzzle“ in this paper.
Volatility in the level of foreign exchange reserves is often referred to as an indication for
intervention operations. Indeed we find that monthly changes in the level of UK reserves are
weakly negatively correlated with monthly changes in the Sterling/US Dollar exchange rate,
which would support the theory that the central bank has intervened to avoid a weakening of
the Pound versus the US Dollar. However, the Bank of England has strongly denied any
interventions in the foreign exchange markets. Therefore we analyse the determinants of the
decrease in the level of foreign exchange reserves in detail.
To this end the effects of valuation changes of the currency components of the reserve stock
are estimated and interest earnings calculated. The analysis of the foreign exchange reserves
for the period August 1996-December 1999 as published in the IMF International Financial
Statistics yields the following results:
 Estimated valuation changes due to exchange rate fluctuations can explain only a small
fraction of the decrease of the reserve stock.
 A rough estimate shows that if interest earnings on the reserve stock are taken into
account and thus are subtracted from the reserves the actual decrease in the level of
reserves appears to be even larger.
 Government transactions (mostly repayments of government bonds) account for the
largest fraction of the reserve decrease.
 After taking account of these factors we still find a difference of about 4,7 billion US
dollars that remains unexplained. According to the Bank of England this difference should
not be taken as an indication for market intervention.
The conclusions that are drawn from the analysis are the following:
 First of all it is shown that variability in the official reserves of a country is not necessarily
associated with intervention operations. The case of the British reserves shows that
transactions for the government account for a large part of the decrease in reserves. Hence
it seems to be inappropriate to take reserve variability as a measure for exchange rate
targeting without analysing the determinants for the variations (as it is often found in
recent research).
 Although the exchange rate of Pound Sterling versus the US dollar has been very stable
we could not find clear evidence for intervention operations using monthly reserve data.
However, even after estimating the valuation effects from exchange rate changes, taking
account of estimated interest earnings and adding up the published transactions for the
government there remains a difference of around 4,7 billion US dollars that is left
unexplained.
11. Introduction
The analysis of exchange rate regimes has been an issue in several recent research papers.
One important result of these studies is that several countries do actually pursue a different
exchange rate regime than that which is officially declared in the statistics of the IMF (see
Levy Yeyati/Sturzenegger (1999), Calvo/Reinhart (2000), Reinhart (2000)). More precisely, it
seems that countries who say they float mostly do stabilise their exchange rate. Reinhart thus
concludes that „...the so-called ‘demise of fixed exchange rates’ is a myth.“ (Reinhart, 2000:
65-66).
Among other factors these studies use the variability of the exchange rate as well as the
variability of foreign exchange reserves as indicators for the actually pursued exchange rate
regime of a country.1 Theory predicts that in a floating exchange rate regime the variability of
the exchange rate is relatively high and the variability of foreign exchange reserves is
relatively low. For countries that do not let their currency float one would expect more
variability in reserves: „In the context of less-than-freely-floating exchange rates, purchases
and sales of international reserves are routinely a means for smoothing exchange rate
fluctuations...“ (Calvo/Reinhart, 2000: 13).
In their study, Calvo/Reinhart surprisingly find that countries which declare to let their
exchange rate float have a higher variability in their reserve stock than countries with a
limited flexibility regime. Thus they conclude: „Countries that say they allow their exchange
rate to float mostly do not – there seems to be an epidemic case of ‘fear of floating’.“
(Calvo/Reinhart, 2000: 2)
With this background the case of the United Kingdom presents a particularly interesting one
to study. After Sterling left the EMS in September 1992 it has been officially declared as a
floating exchange rate. Nevertheless between August 1996 and December 1999 official
reserves decreased substantially (about 40 percent). On the other hand the Sterling/US dollar
exchange rate exhibited a remarkably low variability (especially when compared with the
large appreciation of Sterling against the Deutsch mark in this period). These two
observations seem to contrast the common view that a floating exchange rate regime is
characterised by high volatility in the exchange rate and low volatility in the level of reserves.
Pure textbook economics would suggest that this indicates a stabilisation of the Sterling/US
dollar exchange rate by using foreign exchange intervention. Indeed a sale of its foreign
exchange reserves seems to be in line with a strategy to prevent Sterling from depreciating
against the US dollar (as have other European currencies during this period). However, the
Bank of England explicitly states in its reports that it has not intervened in the foreign
exchange market. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to ask for the reasons of this decrease in
reserves because as Kearney/MacDonald (1986) write: “Insofar as official pronouncements
often seek to influence the behaviour of economic agents rather than to enlighten them, it
would seem prudent to base any conclusions reached upon the evidence of what the
authorities have actually done.” (p. 348).
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the recent discussion about exchange rate regimes.
Taking the case of the UK as example it analyses to what extent variability in foreign
exchange reserves is associated with measures to stabilise exchange rates. The result will shed
light on the usefulness of reserve variability as an appropriate indicator for classifying
exchange rate regimes.
To this end the determinants of the recent decline of UK reserves are analysed. Using data
from the IMF International Financial Statistics as well as reports of the Bank of England we
                                                          
1 Other variables that are used in these studies include interest rate volatility, volatility in base money and
commodity price volatility.
2find that most of the reserves were used for government transactions such as repayments of
Treasury bonds. Only a small fraction of the reserve decline can be attributed to changes in
the valuation of the foreign currency holdings. If interest earnings on the reserve stock are
subtracted from the level of foreign exchange reserves the decline appears to be even larger
than the IFS numbers suggest.
The following chapter will give a short description of the recent history of the Pound Sterling.
Chapter 3 will provide arguments for a stabilisation of the Sterling/US dollar exchange rate.
Chapter 4 will then analyse the movements in the reserve stock. Chapter 5 concludes.
2. History of UK exchange rate regimes and the recent behaviour of Sterling
According to George (1998), the Governor of the Bank of England, there have been two
periods since the breakdown of Bretton Woods in which the Sterling exchange rate was
targeted.
The first period extends from 1987 to 1988 when the Bundesbank policy was shadowed in
order to import stability. This decision was never officially declared but it was evident that the
Bank of England tried to prevent the Sterling/Deutsch mark exchange rate from appreciating
beyond 3 Deutsch mark/Sterling. Interest rate cuts as well as foreign exchange intervention
were used to achieve this aim. Foreign exchange reserves increased nearly 300 percent in
these two years which means that Sterling was sold for foreign currency to avoid appreciation.
Sterling’s participation in the European Monetary System from October 1990 to September
1992 can be seen as the second attempt to target the exchange rate. As is well known, the
German reunification and the subsequent increases of German interest rates posed huge
problems for the monetary policy of the Bank of England. The domestic economic situation in
the early 1990s was not compatible with interest rate increases that would have been
necessary to secure the peg to the Deutsch mark. Thus foreign exchange intervention was
conducted which led to a fall of UK’s international reserves of around 5 billion US dollar
(equivalent to about 12 percent of the total reserve stock).
Since Sterling left the EMS its exchange rate has been considered as “independently floating”
according to the classification of the IMF. This means that foreign exchange intervention is
only conducted to correct “disorderly markets” whereas in a system of “managed floating”
intervention is pursued regularly to target a concrete exchange rate which is not made public.
More precisely, independent floating implies that any foreign exchange intervention is “aimed
at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate,
rather than at establishing a level for it.” 2
The following chart shows the movements of the Pound Sterling against the Deutsch mark
and the US dollar for the post-EMS period.
                                                          
2 See IMF Annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions, p. 2.
3Figure 1: Pound Sterling against US dollar and Deutsch mark
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Source: Datastream, own calculations. October 1992=100.
While the exchange rate versus the Deutsch Mark has appreciated substantially since 1996,
the exchange rate versus the US dollar has remained very stable without any trend.
It is especially the appreciation trend against the Deutsch mark that has attracted public and
academic interest. On the one hand this development contradicts the results of the uncovered
interest parity. Since the UK interest rates have been consistently higher than in Germany one
would have expected Sterling to depreciate in order to compensate for the interest differential
(see Wadhwani, (1999)). On the other hand the Sterling exchange rate versus the Deutsch
Mark reflected ideally the differences in the business cycles, as British GDP growth has been
higher than German GDP growth in the second half of the 1990s.
The Sterling/US dollar exchange rate has not been in the focus of academic research recently.
One reason for its relative stability might stem from the symmetry of business cycles of the
US and UK and to some extent in similar movements of interest rates, as seen in the following
graph. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the determinants of the
Sterling/US dollar exchange rate in detail. Instead we focus on the relationship between the
behaviour of the exchange rate and the fluctuations in foreign exchange reserves.
What we call the “puzzle” in the British foreign exchange reserves is the fact that normally a
declining stock of reserves is associated with a weak currency (since the central bank tries to
stabilise its own currency by buying it against foreign currency). Since the Pound Sterling has
been a strong currency over the last years this does not correspond to the development of its
reserve stock at first sight.
4Figure 2: US versus UK long term interest rates
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Given that the Deutsch mark (and the Euro from 1999 on) has depreciated to a similar extent
against the US dollar as well as against Sterling since mid-1995, the cross rate of both, which
is the Sterling/US dollar exchange rate, should have a tendency to remain stable during this
period. But this logic presupposes that the driving force of the foreign exchange market for
Sterling is the Sterling/Deutsch Mark exchange rate. Why should not the Sterling/US dollar
exchange rate determine the Sterling/Deutsch Mark exchange rate instead? And figure 1
suggests that the Sterling/US dollar did also exhibit low variability during the period from
end-1992 until mid-1995, when the US dollar had a tendency to depreciate against  the
Deutsch Mark.
To illustrate the stability of the Sterling/US dollar exchange rate we attempt to capture the
movements of the exchange rate inside a target band (see figure 3). From end-1992 until
September 1996 a band of +/- 4 percent around a central parity of 0,65 GBP/USD is plotted.
For the period from September 1996 until end-1999 a central parity of 0,61 GBP/USD is
taken and plotted inside a band of +/- 2,5 percent (for comparison: the EMS target zones
before 1993 were +/- 2,25 percent, after 1993 they were +/- 15 percent). The central parities
are chosen ad hoc to capture most of the exchange rate variations.
5Figure 3: Pound Sterling/US dollar exchange rate with target bands
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The result of this experiment is astonishing. One would expect such a low variability within
narrow bands in countries that have limited flexibility exchange rate regimes. A first
theoretical justification for the choice of currency bands is found in Krugman (1991). Given
that the currency bands are credible and thus would be defended by the central bank,
Krugman shows that rational market participants would keep the exchange rate automatically
inside the currency bands. This behaviour is known as stabilising speculation which contrasts
the view that speculation is destabilising. However, the model presupposes that the central
bank announces a central parity as well as target zones for the exchange rate. Both these
assumptions are not valid for the Pound Sterling after it left the EMS. Neither has the Bank of
England announced a target zone nor did it make intervention operations public.
Bhattacharya/Weller (1992) construct a model which explains why central banks might be
tempted not to reveal its exchange rate target. They argue that sterilised intervention is only
an effective policy tool if the market does not know the target of the central bank.
The findings of Dominguez (1998) also indicate that secret interventions have an influence on
exchange rate variability. However, she concludes that “secret interventions were generally
found to increase volatility”. This result would contradict the assumption that the Bank of
England successfully pursued secret interventions to hold the Sterling/US dollar exchange rate
in its target zones.
On the other hand target zones have been criticised especially after Sterling left the EMS in
1992. It was argued that target zones provide a riskless opportunity for speculators to bet
against the central bank which is forced to defend the exchange rate band. After the currency
bands of the EMS were widened to +/- 15 percent around the central parity the variability of
exchange rates declined substantially. This would be an indication that a floating system can
stabilise exchange rates.
Given the fact that the Pound Sterling appreciated immensely against the Deutsch mark/Euro
one would expect that any potential intervention would be aimed at countering this trend.
6However, this would have demanded a purchase of foreign currency (Deutsch mark) and a
sale of Pound Sterling and thus an increase in the level of reserves. A decline of reserves, on
the contrary, indicates that Pound Sterling has been bought against foreign currency. It seems
unlikely that Pound Sterling has been bought against Deutsch mark/Euro as this would only
have supported the strength of Sterling. Nevertheless there might have been reasons for a sale
of US dollars versus Pound Sterling in order to prevent Sterling from depreciating against the
US currency. The following chapter thus tries to find some arguments that would justify such
a behaviour.
3. Benefits of a stable Pound Sterling/US dollar exchange rate for the UK
At first sight it would be more reasonable for Great Britain to promote a stable exchange rate
versus the European currencies, especially the Deutsch mark and the Euro. More than half of
the British trade is done with the European Union whereas only about 15 percent of total trade
volume is conducted with North America. Thus a stable Sterling/Deutsch mark exchange rate
would promote trade relationship with continental Europe and would also make inflation
forecast for the central bank easier. Recent press articles especially focus on the disadvantages
of the strong Sterling versus the Euro for British exports and for foreign direct investment in
Great Britain.
However, there are also good reasons why Great Britain should be concerned with its
exchange rate with the United States.
The political debate in Britain often focuses on the relationship to the European Union. It is
still not clear whether a majority of the British population is voting for joining the European
Monetary Union. But clearly this idea has many opponents. In the last years, especially since
the beginning of EMU, it might have been in the interest of the government not to be
associated with a depreciating Deutsch mark or Euro and therefore to peg Sterling to the US
dollar. The decision about exchange rate policy is still located with the government, even after
the independence of the Bank of England in 1997.
Studies show that the exchange rate of Sterling has also been an important factor for British
voters. Hibbs (1982) estimates popularity functions for governments in USA, Germany and
UK. He finds that only in Great Britain the exchange rate has a significant impact on the
popularity of the government. Interestingly it is especially the relative performance of the
pound versus the US dollar which is important for voters. He  states that “in Britain’s
domestic political life it [the Sterling/US dollar exchange rate] has been viewed as an index of
the nation’s international ‘prestige’.” (Hibbs (1982): 437).
The reasoning that the British government is concerned with the exchange rate of Sterling is
strengthened by studies about the intervention policy of the Bank of England.
Almekinders/Eijffinger (1991) survey the empirical literature about central bank intervention
and state that several studies found that the Bank of England tends to be more concerned with
a weak exchange rate than with a strong one: “...the Bank of England is found to have
assigned systematically more weight to countering depreciations of the effective exchange
rate of the pound and depreciations of the pound vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.”
(Almekinders/Eijffinger (1991): 655). This historical behaviour might explain why the Bank
of England did not counter the appreciation against the Deutsch mark (Euro) and would also
support the assumption that it prevented the Pound Sterling from depreciating against the US
dollar by selling foreign exchange reserves and buying own currency.
Furthermore, the Bank of England pursues a monetary policy of inflation targeting since it left
the EMS. In the context of this framework a depreciating currency is a possible threat to price
stability via its effect on import prices. This fact also adds to the argument that the central
7bank should be more concerned with a depreciating Sterling versus the US dollar than with
Sterling appreciating against the Deutsch mark.
Altogether the above arguments show that the stable Sterling/US dollar exchange rate is in the
interest of the UK. The question now remains if there are indications that the exchange rate
has been stabilised by foreign exchange interventions. The following chapter will therefore
analyse the determinants of the recent decline in the reserve stock.
4. Analysis of the UK foreign exchange reserves
Generally, total international reserves of a country comprise their holdings of foreign
exchange, gold, Special Drawing Rights and IMF Reserves. For the following analysis
reserves will be defined as foreign exchange only.3 As mentioned in Wollmershäuser (2000),
for an analysis of intervention transactions gold is not relevant, Special Drawing Rights are
relatively unimportant and IMF reserves do not fluctuate a lot.
The following figure shows the UK foreign exchange reserves since 1980 in billion US
dollars. The dramatic increase in the years 1987/88 and the fluctuations at the beginning of
the 90s can be explained with attempts of exchange rate targeting (see chapter 2). The
decrease in the last three years from 39 billion to 24 billion US dollars, which corresponds to
nearly 40 percent lacks a plausible explanation so far.
Figure 4: UK official foreign exchange reserves in billion US dollars
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Source: IFS (line 1d.d)
Given the fact that high variability in reserves has historically been a sign for exchange rate
targeting in Great Britain a first assumption can be drawn that reserves were used to stabilise
the Sterling/US dollar exchange rate. More precisely, it seems plausible to sell foreign
exchange and buy Sterling to avoid a depreciation of the own currency. Such an intervention
behaviour is called “leaning against the wind” and means that the central bank “attempts to
move an exchange rate in the opposite direction from its current trend...”
                                                          
3 Monthly reserve data are taken from International Financial Statistics (Foreign Exchange line 1d.d).
8(Dominguez/Frankel, 1993: 63). This strategy would confirm the aforementioned empirical
studies that found the Bank of England tended to counter depreciations more than
appreciations of the Pound Sterling. The following graph therefore plots changes in the level
of foreign exchange reserves against changes in the Sterling/US dollar exchange rate for the
period October 1992-February 2000. The horizontal axis shows monthly absolute changes in
foreign exchange reserves in billion US dollars and the vertical axis shows monthly
percentage changes of the exchange rate (an increase in the exchange rate means a
depreciation of Pound Sterling). The regression line has a negative slope which means that a
decrease in reserves is associated with a depreciating exchange rate and vice versa. This result
would be broadly in line with the strategy of leaning-against-the-wind.
Figure 5: Changes in reserve stock versus changes in GBP/USD exchange rate
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Source: Datastream. Data period: Oct. 1992-Dec. 1999.
However, it needs to be said that this analysis has clear limitations. At first, the correlation
coefficient is only –0,159. Secondly, in order to measure exactly the dimension of foreign
exchange interventions it would be necessary to look at daily changes in foreign reserves.
Monthly data can only serve as proxies.4 On the other hand it should also be noted that a
change in foreign exchange reserves is not necessarily associated with an intervention in the
foreign exchange market. Interest earnings and valuation changes due to fluctuations in
exchange rates also have an impact on the level of a country’s reserve stock (see
Wollmershäuser, 2000). Furthermore not all interventions are associated with changes in the
level of reserves.5
Above all the Bank of England repeatedly stated in her quarterly reports for the period 1997-
1999: “No intervention operations were undertaken [...] with either the Government’s reserves
or the Bank of England’s holdings. Should intervention in the foreign exchange market be
                                                          
4 Consider that a central bank intervenes twice in one month: it sells foreign exchange in the first week and buys
the same amount of foreign exchange in the last week. Monthly data would indicate a constant level of reserves
(as IFS data are always end-of-month) and intervention would not be evident.
5 Dominguez/Frankel (1993) state as example „the Japanese so-called hidden reserves, which are changes in
official deposits of foreign exchange with Japanese commercial banks.“ (p. 69). They are used for intervention
purposes and do not affect official reserves.
9undertaken the quarterly report will provide details of the amount and date of intervention and
an explanation of why it was undertaken.” (Bank of England, Quarterly Report, various
issues). Such a statement has to be taken seriously.
The following subchapters are therefore intended to analyse the decrease in the level of
foreign exchange reserves.
4.1 The structure of UK foreign exchange reserves
The UK foreign exchange reserves consist of the government’s holdings which are held in the
Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA) and the holdings of the Bank of England. The Bank of
England acts as an agent for the management of the government’s account. Interventions with
the holdings of the EEA are decided by HM Treasury.6 The holdings of the Bank of England
may be used discretionary by the central bank to support its monetary policy.7 The official
foreign exchange reserves of Great Britain that are published in the IFS only comprise the
government’s holdings. This is due to the institutional division and the separate ownership of
both reserves. In the following analysis both accounts will be treated separately for three
reasons: First of all the aims of the government and the Bank of England may differ. Since the
Bank of England is independent since 1997 and pursues a policy of inflation targeting she
might be more interested in a strong currency than the government. Secondly, separate data
for the Bank of England holdings were not published before December 1997. Before this date
only IFS data is available which comprises only the government’s holdings in the EEA.
Thirdly, the EEA and the Bank of England apply different valuation procedures for their
foreign exchange holdings which makes them not easily comparable.
4.2 The reserve holdings of the Bank of England
As mentioned above the reserve holdings of the Bank of England are not included in the IFS.
Therefore IFS data for the UK actually underestimate the level of foreign exchange reserves
of Great Britain. The level of the Bank of England holdings averages around 7 billion US
dollars (compared to an average of about 30 billion US dollars in the EEA for the period
10/1996-12/1999). Nevertheless, since the average size of intervention operations is less than
200 million US dollars per day, even the Bank of England’s holdings would suffice for
discretionary interventions.8 However, as can be seen from the following figure, the Bank of
England holdings of foreign exchange do not show a similar decreasing trend as the reserves
of the EEA.
                                                          
6 This institutional framework is similar to the United States, where „the Treasury has primary responsibility for
intervention while the Fed has official responsibility for monetary policy.“ (Dominguez/Frankel, 1993: 49).
7 See the Chancellor of the Exchequer´s letter of 6 May 1997 to the Governor of the Bank of England: „The new
monetary policy framework“. All such interventions have to be sterilised.
8 See Dominguez/Frankel (1993), pp. 88-89 for a discussion of the scale of interventions.
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Figure 6: Bank of England’s foreign exchange holdings (incl. gold) in billion US dollars
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Source: Bank of England, Monetary & Financial Statistics. Data for April 1998 were not available.
The bank’s holdings serve primarily for the pursuit of monetary policy. The fluctuations in the
level of its reserves can, according to Bank of England reports, nearly completely be
explained with the conduct of foreign exchange swaps. In the monthly press releases of the
UK´s official foreign exchange holdings it is said that: “These foreign exchange swaps are
undertaken as a supplement to the Bank’s usual money market techniques to provide sterling
liquidity to the market. The operations are purely technical in nature and have no monetary
policy implications.”9 “In a foreign exchange swap, two parties exchange specific amounts of
two different currencies and repay the amount of the exchange at a future date...” (Hooyman,
1994: 1). A central bank usually swaps own currency against foreign exchange and vice versa
to supply or reduce liquidity to the banking system. The level of foreign exchange reserves
fluctuates temporarily due to the conduct of a swap. If the central bank exchanges foreign
exchange against own currency, its reserve holdings will decrease during the time of the
swap. When the swap is unwound, the level of reserves of the central bank increases again to
the pre-swap level. Thus the influence of foreign exchange swaps on the level of foreign
exchange holdings generally is only temporary.
According to Hooyman (1994), foreign exchange swaps “have no direct effect on the spot (or
forward) exchange rate;” (p. 153). They have an indirect effect via their impact on interest
rates and thus on exchange rates. Nevertheless “foreign exchange swaps might influence the
exchange rate because of a strong announcement effect;” (p. 154).
                                                          
9 The monthly press releases concerning the level of the UK official reserves is published on the website of HM
Treasury at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk.
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Figure 7: Change in BoE’s reserves versus changes in GBP/USD exchange rate
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However, the above graph does not confirm the negative relationship between changes in
absolute reserves and changes in the exchange rate that was found for the official reserves.
This might also be due to data availability (the graph only includes 25 observations).
Therefore we concentrate in the following on the government`s reserve holdings.
4.3 The government’s holdings in the Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA)
The Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA) was founded in 1932 with the aim to counter
undue fluctuations in the exchange rate of Sterling. Its purpose was later extended “to secure
the conservation or disposition in the national interest of the means of making payments
abroad; and for purposes arising from the United Kingdom’s membership of the IMF...”
(Bank of England, 1999).
In order to analyse the decrease of the government’s reserves the published data (taken from
the IFS) will be adjusted for exchange rate changes and interest earnings. This procedure
follows the analysis of Wollmershäuser (2000).10
a) The impact of exchange rate changes on the level of reserves
Contrary to other countries, the UK foreign exchange reserves are not published in terms of
Pound Sterling but in US dollars. Changes in the level of its reserve stock are thus due to
fluctuations of reserve currencies versus the US dollar. For an analysis of their impact it is
necessary to know the currency composition of the reserve stock.
HM Treasury states in the report on the EEA for the year 1997-98: “The ‘benchmark’ for
investing the reserves during 1997-98 [...] was the return to keeping currency exposures split
40:40:20 between US dollar, deutsche mark and yen [...]”.11
The currency composition of the reserve portfolio is published in the monthly statistical
releases of the Bank of England. The average shares of each currency since 1997 that can be
                                                          
10 Wollmershäuser (2000) analyses the foreign exchange reserves of the European System of Central Banks for
the year 1999.
11 HM Treasury (1998), p. 4
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calculated from these data are roughly 40 percent US dollar, 50 percent Deutsch Mark (Euro
after 1999) and about 5 percent Yen (the rest is split between other currencies).
Valuation procedures for the EEA differ from those that are used for the IFS. Thus the data
that are published by HM Treasury do not exactly match the numbers of the IFS. Whereas
“IFS valuation procedures call for the conversion of nondollar foreign exchange holdings in
U.S. dollars at end-of-month exchange rates...” (IFS monthly report) the EEA uses so-called
‘parity rates’ to convert foreign exchange holdings into US dollars. These are calculated each
year at the end of March as the average of daily exchange rates of the period January to
March each year. However, if the last daily exchange rate in March is lower than this average
this exchange rate is taken as parity rate.
The following figure compares the IFS foreign exchange data with the data that is published
by HM Treasury to illustrate the difference.
Figure 8: IFS reserve data versus Bank of England reserve data
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Source: IFS (line 1d.d), Bank of England.
During the period March 1997 to April 1998 IFS data show a lower stock of reserves in terms
of US dollar than published by HM Treasury. The parity rate in this period for the conversion
of Deutsch mark holdings in the EEA was 1,677 Deutsch mark/US dollar. The actual Deutsch
mark/US dollar exchange rate during that time was constantly higher than the parity rate. Due
to the large share of Deutsch mark in the reserve portfolio, the reserve figures that are
published in the IFS, which are based on end-of-month exchange rates, are lower. The
opposite holds for the period April 1998 to April 1999 where the US dollar depreciated
against the Deutsch mark and thus the use of the parity rate of 1,847 Mark/US dollar that was
calculated in March 1998 underestimates the  true value of the UK reserves. From July 1999
on the EEA holdings are calculated with end-of-month exchange rates which explains why
they correspond to the IFS data from that time on.
Valuation changes in the Yen/US dollar exchange rate are less important in this context. First
of all the share of the Japanese currency in the  reserve portfolio is quite small. And secondly
the average difference of the Yen/US dollar exchange rate to the parity rates was not as large
13
as for the Deutsch Mark/US dollar exchange rate during this period.
The fact that even with the use of parity rates the level of foreign exchange reserves has been
declining since 1997 is a first indicator that valuation changes are not able to explain the total
decrease. Nevertheless the following figure shows estimates for the impact that exchange rate
fluctuations had on the level of reserves and compares it to the actual level.
Figure 9: Exchange rate valuation effects on the stock of UK official reserves
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Source: Datastream, own calculations. It is assumed that the currency composition is held constant at 50% Deutsch
mark/Euro, 45% US dollar and 5% Japanese Yen.
The dotted line shows the hypothetical development of the foreign exchange reserve level if
only changes that are due to the valuation of non-US dollar holdings are taken into account.
For the calculation of this line the level of reserves and its currency composition of August
1996 are held constant over time. Using this level of reserves we calculate how changes in the
Deutsch mark/US dollar and Yen/US dollar exchange rates affected the total level of reserves
in US dollars. The question therefore is: To what extent did exchange rate changes influence
the stock of reserves?
It can be seen that the dotted line indicates a decrease which largely stems from the US
dollar’s appreciation versus the Deutsch mark in this period. However, the dotted line only
indicates a decrease of reserves of about 13 percent. As stated above, total reserves actually
fell about 40 percent in this period. The roughly calculated difference is in the dimension of
around 10 billion US dollars. This difference can not be explained by valuation changes due
to exchange rate fluctuations.
b) The impact of interest earnings on the level of reserves
Foreign exchange reserves are usually invested in fixed income securities and the interest that
is earned over time increases the level of reserves. From the Monetary & Financial Statistics
which are published by the Bank of England on a monthly basis one can obtain information
about the composition of the reserve portfolio and the maturities of the securities. On average,
roughly 70 percent of reserves are held in bonds and notes, about 10 percent are invested in
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the money market and the rest consists of currency deposits with other monetary authorities
and banks.12
Assuming an average currency composition of 10 percent Yen, 40 percent US dollar and 50
percent Deutsch mark (Euro) a rough estimate yields that interest earnings for the period
August 1996 to December 1999 have been in the range of 4,7 billion US dollars.13 However,
as this calculation for simplicity does not take into account fluctuations in bond prices the
result is only a rough indicator.
If these interest earnings are subtracted from the reserve stock, the decrease for the period
mid-1996 to end-1999 appears to be even larger. The total decrease from August 1996 to
December 1999 was 15 billion US dollars. Adding 4,7 billion US dollars for interest earnings
and subtracting 5 billion US dollars due to exchange rate fluctuations still yields a decrease of
14,7 US dollars. The following chapter thus looks for further factors that might explain the
decrease.
c) Further explanations for the decrease of the reserve stock
The report of HM Treasury for the period 1997/1998 states three main reasons for the decline
of the reserve stock in the EEA: a falling gold price, the appreciation of Pound Sterling
against the reserve currencies and the repayment of a Deutsch mark-denominated bond that
had been issued by the British government. Since our analysis focuses on a definition of
foreign exchange reserves that excludes gold, the decline of the gold price is not relevant in
our context. Concerning exchange rate changes and their impact on the level of reserves we
showed that these fluctuations (mainly the appreciation of the US dollar versus the Deutsch
mark/Euro) can at most explain a third of the total decrease. Furthermore as we use the data of
IFS we are not concerned with the exchange rates of the reserve currencies versus the Pound
Sterling but versus the US dollar.
This leaves the repayment of the Deutsch mark bond as one explanation. Indeed if one looks
at the monthly reports of the UK official reserves one finds a range of transactions that lead to
movements in the level of reserves. Among these are payments or receipts from the issuance
or repayment of Government Treasury Bills and Notes.14
There were several bond repayments during the period 1996-1999, for example a Deutsch
mark bond in October 1997 which decreased reserves by about 3 billion US dollars. In
January 1998 a Treasury bond with a value of about 1,8 billion US dollars denominated in
ECU was repaid and in January 1999 1,6 billion US dollars were taken from the reserves to
repay a Euro-Treasury note. Nearly all of the reported debt repayments were denominated in
Euro, Ecu or Deutsch mark.
Other more regular transactions include payments for the purpose of the Exchange Cover
Schemes (ECS). The ECS is a fund which grants foreign currency loans to public enterprises
and authorities that were insured against exchange rate fluctuations. State enterprise that are
indebted in foreign currency can sell their foreign currency to the EEA and obtain Pound
Sterling in exchange. When those enterprises have to repay their foreign currency loans they
                                                          
12 See table 24.1 of monthly Monetary & Financial Statistics which can be obtained via Internet at
www.bankofengland.co.uk.
13 The average reserve stock during this period has been 29 billion US dollars. For simplicity it is assumed that
70 percent of reserves were invested in 10-year government bonds and 30 percent in the money market. Taking
the averages of long- and short-term interest rates for this period for the different currencies and assuming a
currency composition of 50% Deutsch mark/Euro, 45% US dollar and 5% Japanese Yen, calculation of interest
earnings result in 4,7 billion US dollars.
14 See Appendix.
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can buy the necessary foreign exchange from the EEA for the same exchange rate for which
they sold them to the EEA. Thus their foreign exchange risk is borne by the EEA who
receives a premium for this. According to EEA reports, no new ECS-loans were granted since
1987. However, there are still outstanding loans of state enterprises that fall due and the EEA
has to sell the necessary foreign exchange. These transactions also decrease the level of UK
official reserves.
d) Conclusions from the above analysis of EEA reserves
A simple calculation yields the following results. Official foreign exchange reserves as
published in the IFS (which correspond as mentioned above with the stock of reserves held in
the EEA) show a decrease of the level of reserves of 15,5 billion US dollars for the period
August 1996-December 1999. If interest earnings are taken into account, the decrease appears
to be even larger. Adjusted for estimated interest earnings of about 4,7 billion US dollars, the
total fall in the reserve stock is 19,7 billion US dollars. A rough estimate showed that
exchange rate fluctuations account for about 5 billion US dollars (mainly explained by the US
dollar’s appreciation versus Deutsch mark/Euro) of this amount. This leaves a difference of
14,7 billion US dollars. Of these, nearly 10 billion US dollars are explained by government
transactions as mentioned in the appendix. The difference of roughly 4,7 billion US dollars is
the so-called underlying change.
The Bank of England notes that “the underlying change is the result of a variety of
transactions, both debits and credits, including, for example, transactions for Government
departments, transactions with other central banks, and interest receipts and payments. For
these reasons, the underlying change should not be taken as an indication of market
intervention.”15
Generally foreign exchange intervention can be defined as “...any transaction or
announcement by an official agent of a government that is intended to influence the value of
an exchange rate or the country’s stock of foreign exchange reserves.” (Dominguez/Frankel,
1993: 55). There are also broader definitions of intervention that include transactions by the
central bank that are undertaken for customers such as the own government (the conversion of
foreign currency debt that the government has issued by the central bank would be an
example). “Although customer transactions are considered passive interventions, it is
important to recognise that, since the timing of these transactions is under the discretion of the
central bank, they can still serve to signal information to the market.” (Dominguez/Frankel,
1993: 65). With this broader definition in mind, the Bank of England’s transactions with the
government might serve to influence exchange rates.
In the past large swings in the level of UK official reserves were associated with foreign
exchange intervention. Insofar it seems to be fair to analyse for which reasons reserves
declined by 40 percent in the last years. According to Dominguez/Frankel (1993), “most
intervention operations are not publicly announced.” (p. 59). At first sight this does seem
confusing, as the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions (especially sterilised
interventions) depends largely on the signalling effect of these central bank transactions on
the market. Although the analysis did not prove that the stable Sterling/US dollar exchange
rate is the result of intervention by the central bank a simple scatter plot indicated that
decreases in the reserve level fall together with a depreciating Sterling/US dollar exchange
rate. This finding is generally compatible with an intervention strategy of leaning against the
wind. However, a thorough analysis of intervention behaviour would have to use daily reserve
data – monthly figures can only give indications.
                                                          
15 See HM Treasury monthly press release on UK official reserves.
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5. Summary and conclusions
British foreign exchange reserves decreased by 40 percent in the past years. Normally this
would be a sign for a weak currency or more precisely an indication that a central bank sells
foreign exchange to buy own currency and thus fights the depreciation. However, the UK
Pound Sterling has not been a weak currency in recent years. On the contrary: it has been very
strong against the Deutsch mark/Euro. In general this is what we mean by calling these two
facts the “British foreign exchange reserves puzzle”.
It was shown that in contrast to the exchange rate of Pound Sterling against Deutsch mark, the
exchange rate Sterling/US dollar has been extremely stable. This is insofar interesting as other
currencies depreciated against the US dollar (Deutsch mark) or exhibited high volatility
(Japanese Yen). A simple scatter plot indicated a weak negative relationship between the
change in reserves and changes in the Sterling/US dollar exchange rate; an observation that is
broadly in line with an intervention strategy aimed at preventing a depreciation.
An analysis of the UK foreign exchange reserves showed that the inclusion of interest
earnings makes the decline larger. Exchange rate valuation changes only account for a small
fraction of the total decrease. The case of Great Britain thus confirmed the following finding
of Calvo/Reinhart (2000): “In principle, the variance of reserves should be zero in a pure
float. In reality, however, it is not that simple, as reserves may change owing to fluctuations in
valuation and the accrual of interest earnings. However, even absent these, there are other
factors that influence changes in reserves.” (Calvo/Reinhart, 2000: 19). A large part of the
decline is explained by transactions for the government, like repayments of government bonds
and Treasury bills. However, there still remains a substantial difference that is not specifically
explained. Nevertheless, HM Treasury and the Bank of England have repeatedly stated that
they have not intervened in the foreign exchange market.
As we could only use monthly data for reserves it could not be proven that there have been
interventions in the Pound Sterling/US dollar exchange rate by British authorities.
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.
At first, the analysis showed that the reporting of UK reserve movements is complex. There
were different valuation methods for the EEA and the Bank of England’s holdings, the latter
are not included in the official reserve numbers and a considerable part of the reserve changes
remains unexplained. More transparency in the reporting of foreign exchange reserves would
thus make statements of the central bank concerning interventions more credible. First steps
in this direction have recently been taken by publishing the reserves in accordance with the
methodology developed by the IMF and the G10 central banks (since July 1999).
Secondly, it was shown that government transactions account for a large part of the variability
of UK international reserves. Unless these transactions serve to influence the exchange rate
(“passive interventions”) this result contradicts with the view that changes in the reserve stock
of a country should be taken as an indication of intervention. Taking account of the fact that
there are several factors that determine changes in reserves it does not seem appropriate to
simply measure exchange rate intervention by looking at changes in the monthly IFS reserve
data. Besides, the case of the UK reserves showed that the official reserves do not include the
holdings of the central bank and thus actually underestimate the true amount of reserves.
Thirdly, if goverment transactions account for such a large part of reserve variability then one
can ask why these payments are not compensated by additional purchases of foreign exchange
to keep the overall level of reserves constant. This would be similar to a central bank that
offsets changes in the money supply that are caused by autonomous transactions by adjusting
their short term interest rates.
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Appendix: Monthly transactions in the Exchange Equalisation Fund (EEA) in million
US dollars
Repay-
ments
under ECS
EMI
Swap
reva-
luation
Repayment of
HMG debt
assigned from
public sector
Issuance /
Repayment of
Government
Treasury
Bills
Issuance /
Repayment of
Government
Treasury
notes
Other long
term debt
issuance /
repayments
Other
(gold/
priv-
atizati
on)1
Total
transactions
Monthly
change in
reserves
according to
IFS data
1996 Sept. -8 -3905 +148 -3764 -4558,02
Oct. -10 -19 -13 +1 +650 +1992 +2601 +2950,65
Nov. -18 -17 -344,69
Dec. -12 +1 -150 -161 -412,50
1997 Jan. -146 +12 -105 +3 -2496 -2732 -3931,34
Feb. -16 +1 -15 -758,34
Mar. -7 -7 +112,01
Apr. -88 +237 -75 -1 +571 +644 -27
May -16 -16 +381
June -11 -11 -249
July -4 +44 -50 -1 +575 +564 -568
Aug. -13 -30 -1 -44 +291
Sept. -107 -1 -108 +267
Oct. -9 -17 -12 +568 -2982 -2452 -1839
Nov. -14 -1 -15 -555
Dec. -7 -1 -153 -161 -1369
1998 Jan. -1 -99 -1769 -1869 -1877
Feb. -14 -14 +108
Mar. -6 +1 -5 -342
Apr. -8 +54 +1 +538 +585 +1031
May -13 +1 -12 -92
June -3 -3 -298
July -1 -38 +1 +541 +503 +174
Aug. -9 -9 +105
Sept. -6 -6 +880
Oct. -8 +1 +549 +542 +1000
Nov. -8 -1 +1 -8 -693
Dec. -3 +3 -155 -155 -1511
1999 Jan. -2 +3 -1611 -1612 -1985
Feb. -10 +3 -7 -1504
Mar. -6 +2 -4 -263
Apr. -9 -316 +538 +213 +121
May -9 -1 -316 -326 -297
June -3 -317 -320 -159
July -2 -852 +527 +42 -285 +756
Aug. -9 -852 -861 -578
Sept. -8 -1066 +37 -1037 -547
Oct. -9 +519 +510 +828
Nov. -9 -1 -10 +204
Dec. -3 -157 +68 -92 +102
Total -9976 -15447,23
Source: HM Treasury Press Releases (www.hm-treasury.gov.uk), International Financial Statistics; All data in million US dollars.
1) Other transactions include: foreign exchange components from privatization receipts (Sept. 1996) and valuation gains from
gold sales (July/Sept./Dec. 1999).
